Michigan Law Review
Volume 57

Issue 5

1959

Setting the Price in an Close Corporation Buy-Sell Agreement
David Keith Page
Harvard University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons,
Securities Law Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons

Recommended Citation
David K. Page, Setting the Price in an Close Corporation Buy-Sell Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1959).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol57/iss5/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

SETTING THE PRICE IN A CLOSE CORPORATION
BUY-SELL AGREEMENT

David Keith Page*
stockholders of a close corporation may consider it important to keep control of the business "within the family."
This can be accomplished through a restrictive agreement, typically one which gives the corporation or the remaining stockholders a first option to purchase the shares of any departing
stockholder.1 The original owners may also wish to guarantee
themselves a ready purchaser for their stock when they die or
leave the business. This second objective can be attained by
adopting a restrictive agreement which places an obligation on
the departing stockholder to sell to the corporation or to the
surviving stockholders, who in tum are obligated to buy from him.
Such a mandatory scheme is commonly known as a buy-sell
agreement.
Perhaps the most challenging and certainly the most significant decision confronting the draftsman of a buy-sell agreement
is the selection of the price or price-fixing technique. From a
legal standpoint, the agreement may be void or unenforceable on
the ground of vagueness if the price-fixing provision is omitted.2
From a practical standpoint the provision is the heart of the
contract. It is the device which determines, often at some remote
future date, the financial position of the parties vis-a-vis the
corporation. Thoughtfully conceived and drafted it can be the
mechanism for a mutually satisfactory division of closely held
business interests. But when selected without adequate reflection
as to its appropriateness in a given situation, it can be the source
of confusion, disputes, and often litigation.3
The price-fixing provision must be, in every sense of the
word, tailor-made. Because each corporate situation is unique,
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For an excellent discussion of all aspects of restrictive agreements, see O'Neal,
"Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting,"
65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 773 (1952).
2See Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597 0.t 603, 124 A. 118 (1924) (dictum).
3 See Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. REV. 325 at 346 (1952).
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no one technique can be said to be superior to all others in every
instance.4 Nor for that matter can any particular technique be
condemned as universally unsatisfactory, although one is hard
pressed to find justification for the use of certain methods, such
as allowing the board of directors to set the price. However, there
are certain considerations which are so fundamental to the intelligent selection of a price-fixing technique that a brief discussion
of them here might be useful before proceeding to a more detailed
examination of the techniques themselves.
FACTORS To BE CoNSIDERED IN SELECTING A PrucE-FIXING
TECHNIQUE

When the stockholders of a small corporation agree to buy
each other out after certain events, such as the death or retirement
of one of them, is it necessary that the acquisition price be "fair"?
Implicit in this question is the assumption that one can define
and pinpoint a "fair" price. Presumably it is the price that would
be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller in an arm's-length
transaction immediately following the event. Yet the very nature
of the typical close corporation makes this definition illusory.
Seldom does closely held stock have an ascertainable market value.5
There may be no buyers at all for an interest in a personal, family,
or highly specialized business. Indeed it is the very prospect of
unsaleability which normally gives rise to the buy-sell agreement
itself. Nevertheless, there are methods which can be used to
approximate the theoretical "market value" of a small business
with some degree of objectivity and reliability. Therefore, the
real question the draftsman must ask himself is "How essential
is it that I select the one price-fixing technique which will reflect
most closely 'market value' "?
There is something to be said for a less-than-fair-value purchase
of a departing stockholder's interest, sometimes called a "cheap
takeover." While actively engaged in th~ business, a stockholder
contributes to its growth and normally withdraws much of his
interest in the form of salary. Once the active relationship is

4 See ROHRLICH, ORGANIZlNG CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed.,

106 (1953).
5 See Kragen, "Some Thoughts on the Valuation of Closely Held Business Interests,"

43

CALIF.

L. REv. 781 (1955).
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terminated by death or retirement, it may not be unreasonable
to consider his interest as nominal and to value it accordingly,
thereby freeing the business from draining obligations to past
members.6 This view may be especially attractive where the corporation is a family business; for even a "fair" payment would
merely redistribute wealth within the family unit. However, as
will be pointed out later, serious tax disadvantages may result
from undervaluation in such circumstances. Then, too, if at the
date of contracting the parties seem to have an equal chance of
survival, there is the psychological factor that each party expects,
or at least hopes, that he will be the last to go. Coupled with a
natural inclination to gamble, this factor could and probably
does have a mutually depressing effect on the price fixed. 7
Despite the above considerations, it seems preferable in most
cases to fix the price as close as possible to the anticipated "fair"
value. Not only might this be crucial in determining the valuation
for estate and inheritance tax purposes, but it also substantially
reduces the likelihood of friction or even litigation between the
parties. 8 Although prevailing law does not seem to regard mere
inadequacy of price as sufficient to render restrictive agreements
invalid,9 there are some decisions to the contrary.10 By giving each
party a "fair" price, the agreement is simply compensating each
stockholder for his labor and foresight. The parties are not, therefore, forced during their lifetimes to squeeze the corporation of
large sums in the form of salaries or dividends.
Of course it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice complete fairness
in order to satisfy other objectives ~uch as ease of application and
economy of operation. Any resulting disparity in price can be
justified by the fact that each party stands to gain as much as he
might lose from the dispari~, at least where each party has an

6 Ness, "Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements and Options To Purchase
Stock on Death," 49 COL. L. REV. 796 at 816 (1949).
7Id. at 815.
SLAIKIN, DEATH, TAXES AND YOUR BUSINESS 22 (1948).
9 See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y. (2d) 534, 141 N.E. (2d) 812 (1957),
where the court granted specific performance to an agreement which required the
retiring shareholders to take a price equal only to what they had originally paid,
although the actual value was considerably higher.
10 See, e.g., Greene v. E.H. Rollins &: Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. (2d) 249 (1938),
where a provision allowing the corporation to repurchase stock at a price equal to
asset value per share, exclusive of good-will or going-concern value, was declared invalid
as unfair and against public policy.
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equal chance of being a buyer rather than a seller under the
agreement. 11
In addition to being "fair," the price-fixing mechanism must
be framed in such a way as to eliminate or minimize future controversies. Vague or ambiguous terminology is the most frequent
cause of litigation over buy-sell agreements. 12 Some techniques,
such as using par value or a flat dollar amount as the transfer
price, are by nature free from interpretative difficulties. Others,
for example basing the price on "book value," can be deceptively
simple. Still others, particularly those involving formulae, contain
terms which must be precisely defined if the technique is to
operate at all.
The buy-sell agreement will offer little protection to some
stockholders if the agreement price, though fair when set, can be
manipulated by those in control of the corporation. This is the obvious objection to the technique which places the price determination in the hands of the company's board of directors. 13 More subtle
forms of manipulation can be achieved under other price-fixing
techniques. For example, where "book value" is to be the guide
to valuation, the directors' control of such decisions as the amount
to be included in reserves and whether to value assets at cost or
current worth may significantly affect the price. Although the
directors are probably required by law to act in good faith in
these matters, 14 the scope of their permissible conduct remains
extremely broad. It is occasionally suggested that a provision be
included in the restrictive agreement permitting a stockholder
unilaterally to withdraw after a number of years. 15 Although
there may be instances in which such a provision would prove
useful,16 it can also lead to a form of manipulation. When the
specified period is about to expire, the stockholder whose prospects
11 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 797 (1952).
12 The following terms, among others, have created difficulty -because of their uncertain meaning: earnings, Gerding v. Baier, 143 Md. 520, 122 A. 675 (1923); net cost
price, Cohen v. Elias, 176 App. Div. 763, 163 N.Y.S. 1051 (1917); net returns, Jeffrey v.
Genter, (Pa. Com. Pl. 1944) 45 Lack. Jur. IOI.
13 See Krebs v. McDonald's Exr., (Ky. 1953) 266 S.W. (2d) 87 at 89-90.
14 See First Nat. Bank of Montclair v. Coldwell, 286 App. Div. 1079, 145 N.Y.S. (2d)
674 (1956).
15 See Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the
Transferability of Stock," 43 ILL. B. J. 766 at 776 (1955).
16 See Overbeck and Teevan, "W-hat Every Lawyer Should Know About Buy and
Sell Agreements," 43 ILL. B. J. 264 at 277-278 (1955).
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for survival look the best can force his co-stockholder to renegotiate a lower valuation for their interests by threatening to withdraw from the agreement altogether, leaving the co-stockholder
with unmarketable stock. There may be other occasions, however,
when a provision for complete termination of the agreement
would be desirable, as in the event of corporate bankruptcy,
receivership, or dissolution or upon the death of a specified
number of stockholders.17
Cost to the client must, of course, be considered in drafting
the restrictive agreement. Certain techniques, like "book value"
and capitalization of earnings, have pivotal terms which require
precise definition. Consequently they will take more of the
draftsman's time. Techniques involving appraisal or arbitration
may be easier to draft, but the actual use of these methods at the
operative date can be quite expensive.18
In formulating the price-fixing mechanism, the lawyer should
not overlook the effect on the value of the corporation of the event
which makes the agreement operative. Since most stockholders
in close corporations are active in the daily conduct of the business,
the death or retirement of any given stockholder might severely
impair the corporation's earning capacity. This is particularly true
in service businesses, where good will rests on the personalities of a
few key men, and it is also true where a stockholder has peculiar
talents or information vital to the business. To set the agreement
price, by capitalizing earnings for example, without adjusting for
the operative event would unjustly burden the survivors and
give a windfall to the departing stockholder. Some attorneys
provide for the impact of the operative event by specifically excluding any figure for good will from the computation of the
purchase price, usually based on "book value." 19 This may jeopardize an otherwise low federal estate tax valuation, and it would
be better to assign a nominal value to good will when using "book
value," and in other techniques to spell out that good will was
considered in making the ultimate formulation.
If one of the parties has a minority interest in the corporation,
17 Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the Transferability of Stock," 43 Iu.. B. J. 766 at 776 (1955).
18 See RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ·ENTERPRISES, rev. ed.,
112 (1953).
19 Cf. Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements,'' 95 TRUSTS AND EsrATES
408 (1956).
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not only must he protect himself against possible abuse of the
price-fixing mechanism by those in control but he must also not
permit his weaker bargaining position to force him to accept an
undesirable technique.20 A more advantageous approach would
be to press for a "fair" method of valuation and then agree to have
a certain sum deducted from his share or added to the majority
holder's share to allow for the inherent differences in value between controlling and minority interests. A similar provision can
be utilized in multi-party buy-sell agreements where one stockholder owns "key" stock.21
Whether the parties to the buy-sell agreement are only the
stock.holders inter se or include the corporate entity, it is quite
common to provide the cash necessary to purchase departing interests by taking out insurance on the life of each stock.holder. The
introduction of this insurance feature raises many ticklish problems,22 especially in the area of federal income taxes. This article
will not attempt to deal with those problems except insofar as
the use of insurance has direct repercussions on fixing a price.
Obviously, the closer one is able to predict the ultimate purchase
price the better he will be able to choose the proper amount of
insurance needed for the funding. On the other hand, there are
some cases in which the purchase price will turn in part on the
amount of insurance procured. If the corporate entity is a party
to the buy-sell agreement, the amount of insurance proceeds received by the corporation on the death of a stock.holder becomes
an asset of the corporation and ought to be included in the
computation of the deceased's interest.23 Some agreements go so
far as to fix the purchase price at "book value" or the amount of
the insurance proceeds, whichever is higher. 24 Naturally this can
give a substantial windfall to the departing stock.holder if his
interest has been over-insured.
20 See Ness, "Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements and Options To
Purchase Stock on Death," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 796 at 816 (1949).
21 Cf. Bushman, "Valuation of Close Corporation Securities," 90 TRUSTS AND ESTATES
228 at 233 (1951).
22 See note, 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 687 (1958).
23 For a fuller discussion of the impact of insurance on fixing a price and the possible inequities that can result when the insurance proceeds are omitted from the computation, see Davis, "Recent Developments in Business Purchase Agreements," 94 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 284 (1955).
24 See Overbeck and Teevan, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Buy and
Sell Agreements," 43 ILL. B. J. 264 at 269 (1955).
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The selection of the appropriate documents in which to place
the agreement itself has some bearing on the price-fixing provision. Broadly speaking, buy-sell provisions are valid whether
placed in the articles of incorporation or in a separate stockholders'
agreement.25 There is some controversy concerning the validity
of placing the buy-sell provisions in the corporate by-laws in the
absence of express authorization by the articles to do so.26 The
practice has generally been, according to one leading authority,
to place the buy-sell provisions in separate stockholders' agreements rather than in either the articles or the by-laws.27 There
may be good reason for omitting the buy-sell provisions from
the articles, at least in jurisdictions where the appropriate state
agency carefully examines all charter provisions and rejects those
it considers improper.28 In Illinois, for example, the "Corporation
Department of the Office of Secretary of State refuses to accept for
filing articles which contain a restrictive provision fixing an unfair
price, such as one requiring a shareholder to sell his $100 par
value shares for a flat price of $50."29 Nevertheless, it would seem
preferable whenever possible to put the provisions in both the
articles and a separate agreement.30
Regardless whether the provisions are placed in the articles,
by-laws, or separate agreement, they should definitely be included
on every stock certificate.31 The Uniform Stock Transfer Act
provides " ... and there shall be no restriction upon the transfer of
shares so represented by virtue of any by-laws of the corporation, or otherwise, unless the right of the corporation to such . . .
restriction is stated upon the certificate."32 This statute has sometimes been construed to mean that a mere reference in the stock
certificate to the by-laws or other source of the restriction is

25 ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed.,
102-103 (1953).
26 See Cataldo, "Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation," 37 VA. L.
REV. 229 at 237 (1951).
27 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. REv. 773 at 782 (1952).
28 Id. at 783.
29 Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the Transferability of Stock," 43 ILL. B. J. 766 at 775 (1955).
30 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. :REv. 773 at 786-788 (1952).
31 Cataldo, "Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation," 37 VA. L.
REv. 229 at 231 (1951).
32 Uniform. Stock Transfer Act §15, 6 UL.A. 20.
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insufficient to impose the restriction upon a transferee of the
stock, even one who had actual notice of the restrictive provisions.38
Presumably, if the restrictive provisions were too long to be included in full upon the stock certificate, the statute would be
satisfied by a statement on the certificate of the duty of the holder
to sell to the corporation or to the other stockholders, mention
of the price or price-fixing method, and a reference to the articles,
by-laws, or separate agreement where the complete terms might
be.found.
Naturally the legality of any price-fixing technique must be
checked under local law. This is especially true of provisions which .
set the price by arbitration, for executory agreements to arbitrate
are unenforceable in many jurisdictions.34
•
The most obvious, and often thought to be the most important, consideration is the tax consequences of the buy-sell agreement, particularly the binding effect of the price fixed in the
agreement on the estate and inheritance tax valuation of a deceased
stockholder's shares. Discussion of this subject will be postponed
until after we have considered more closely the individual pricesetting techniques.
TH'.E TECHNIQUES OF PRICE-FIXING

Although the variety of price-fixing methods is limited only
by the imagination of the draftsman, authorities have noted certain
methods which are employed with some regularity. 35 Those which
88 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Topsham Tel. Co., (Vt. 1957) 132 A. (2d) 170; but see Allen
v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y. (2d) 534, 141 N.E. (2d) 812 (1957).
34 At common law, a general agreement to submit to arbitration any and all disputes
arising under a contract is voidable at will by either party ·before a valid award is made.
Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 445 (1874). However, the agreement is enforceable if an award is made, and damages may be recovered for its breach. Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); 135 A.L.R. 79 (1941). Statutes and an
increasing judicial willingness to accept arbitration as a quick and inexpensive way to
settle disputes have tended to restrict the rule. Johnson v. Noble, 13 N.H. 286 (1842);
Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 344 (1854); Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
~57 N.C. 194, 72 S.E. 998 (1911); Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service
Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935); Mdntosh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 106 Mont. 434, 78 P. (2d)
82 (1938).
35 The common methods of valuation include: flat price, book value, market price,
appraisal, arbitration capitalization of earnings, authorization of director or shareholders
to establish price, years purchase formula, .best offer, tax valuation, or some combination
of -these. See FINNEY AND MIµ.ER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING: INTRODUGrORY, 4th ed., 272
(1953); O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning
and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REV. 773 at 801-804 (1952); New England Trust Co. v. Abbott,
162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894).
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seem to be the most suitable for the ordinary close corporation
are discussed in the sections which follow. The others, in the
opinion of this ·writer, do not merit extensive treatment here
because they contain certain objectionable features which make
them unacceptable for general use. For example, an attempt to
set the price by use of the "market value" of the stock, while
desirable in theory, is usually impossible in close corporations,
which typically have no ready market for their stock.88 Using
the average value of listed stocks in the same industry as a guide
to "market value" can be extremely dangerous because it precludes
consideration of the unique features of the corporation in questio?J.
and neglects the influence of the operative contingency on true
value. 87 Similarly, a price based on the "best offer" received by
the stockholder for his shares within a given period is completely
unsatisfactory where the stock, under the buy-sell agreement, is
subject to mandatory sale to the corporation or other stockholders.88 As a practical matter, no offers for that stock will be
made. A price-fixing method which accepts the valuation made
for estate or inheritance tax purposes is not desirable because
of the delay involved and the loss of possible tax benefits the
restriction might otherwise create.89 Also undesirable are methods
which use as the purchase price estimated future earnings of the
corporation within a given period or installment payments of
a percentage of actual future earnings within that period. These
methods involve not only the risk and unpredictability of future
profits but, at least in the latter case, the probability that the
Commissioner will make an independent determination of value
which will be higher than the price actually received by the estate.
The obvious disadvantage of a method which allows the surviving
shareholders or directors to set the price is that it gives "a carte
blanche grant of power to ... set the valuation at whatever they
[consider] reasonable so long as they [act] in good faith." 40 One
36 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. REv. 773 at 801 (1952).
37 But see Johnson, Shapiro and O'Meara, "Valuation of Closely-Held Stock for
Federal Tax Purposes: Approach to an Objective Method," 100 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 166
(1951), where it is suggested that the value of comparable listed stocks be used to fix
a floor-ceiling range on the valuation.
as See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. REv. 773 at 802 (1952).
39 Id. at 805.
40 Krebs v. McDonald's Exr., (Ky. 1953) 266 S.W. (2d) 87 at 90.
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major difficulty with the so-called Solomon's choice method in
which the survivor makes up two equal lists of assets from which
the executor takes his choice41 is that it forces a termination of
the business if the executor chooses the list with most of the
working assets.

Book Value
The method which appears to be the "most frequently used
starting point" for fixing the price in a buy-sell agreement is book
value. 42 No doubt the reason for this extensive use of book value
is its apparent simplicity of operation coupled with reasonably
accurate approximation of "fair" value. However, as many lawyers
have discovered to their dismay, both the simplicity and accuracy
of book value are likely to be illusory.43
What exactly is meant by the term "book value" when used as
a measure of price in a buy-sell agreement? This question has been
the subject of much litigation and the answers have not been
uniform. 44 The controversy involves whether to have a "strict, literal utilization of book accounts (as reflected in a balance sheet)
or whether modifications, other than for blatant errors, may be
made to 'correct' or more fairly set forth the book values." 45 Although the courts tend to lean toward the strict, literal interpretation,46 especially when the provision is tied to the accounting practices commonly used by the corporation,47 there is no guarantee
that they will do so in any particular case. In the recent case of
Aron v. Gillman,48 for example, a New York court was construing
a restrictive agreement under which the price was to be set by
"book value" as "determined by the most recent audit" of the company. The court held that the value of the inventory should have
been based on a physical count rather than on the estimated basis
41 See Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. REv. 325 at 325 (1952).
42 Id. at 327.
43 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 799 (1952).
44See comment, 31 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 608 at 611 (1956). Compare Stans and Goedert,
"What Is Book Value?" 99 J. AccoUNTANCY 38 Gan. 1955) with May and Dohr, "Book
Value: A Brief Comment on the Stans-Goedert Article," id. at 42 (April 1955).
45 Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements," 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 408
(1956).
46Ibid.
47 See, e.g., Soechtig v. Amick, 285 App. Div. 701, 140 N.Y.S. (2d) 85 (1955).
48 309 N.Y. 157, 128 N.E. (2d) 284 (1955).
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actually used in the "most recent audit." Moreover, an item for
accrued income taxes, which had not been reflected on the
company's balance sheet, was required to be considered in the
determination of "book value." This case, and others like it, demonstrates that the attorney who drafts a buy-sell agreement calling
for the purchase of the stock at "book value" without further definition may be subjecting his client to costly litigation.49 It is absolutely essential that the agreement spell out exactly what is
meant by "book value," who is to make the determination of disputed items, and the conclusiveness of that determination. The inclusion of some vague phrase limiting "book value" in accordance
with "generally accepted accounting practices" or "recognized accounting principles" is of less than no help since it invites a dispute as to what practices and principles are so accepted and recognized. One way of minimizing the possibility of future disputes
over the meaning of "book value" is to provide that the net worth
(assets minus liabilities) which appears on the balance sheet for the
last fiscal period shall be conclusively deemed to equal the aggregate book value of all stock in the corporation.rm The difficulty
with this method is that, though reducing definitional problems, it
may result in a figure which is not fair to either the buyer or the
seller in terms of the actual underlying values of the corporation's
assets. Moreover, it is especially disadvantageous to a minority
stockholder since it carries the seeds of potential manipulation of
balance sheet figures by the directors who, as long as they act in
good faith, are under no obligation to reflect the actual value of
the assets on the corporation's books.51 Thus the minority may find
themselves at the mercy of the majority as was true in Druchlieb
v. Harris 52 where the court sustained a write-down of good will
and other assets by the directors in the face of a restrictive agreement calling for a purchase price based on "book value."

49 Compare Hollister v. Fredler, 22 N.J. Super. 439, 92 A. (2d) 52 (1952), with Fleming
v. Fleming, 2ll Iowa 1251, 230 N.W. 359 (1931), and Elhard v. Rott, 36 N.D. 2ll, 162
N.W. 302 (1917). See comment, 24 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 592 (1955).
50 See Rubel v. Rubel, 721 Miss. 848, 75 S. (2d) 59 (1954); Lane v. Barnard, 185
App. Div. 754, 173 N.Y.S. 714 (1919); Gurley v. Woodbury, 177 N.C. 70, 97 S.E. 754 (1919).
But cf. Wineinger v. Kay, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 58 S.W. (2d) 876; Mills v. Rich, 249
Mich. 489, 229 N.W. 462 (1930). See comment, 53 MrGH. L. REv. 972 at 987 (1955). Cf.
Overbeck and Teevan, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Buy and Sell Agreements," 43 !LI.. B.J. 264 at 269-270 (1955).
lilSee, e.g., Corbett v• .McClintock-Marshall Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 165, 151 A. 218 (1930).
52 209 N.Y. 211, 102 N.E. 599 (1913).
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Manipulation can be avoided if it is provided that "book
value" is to be determined not by the corporation's books alone
but by an outside accountant who may use the books as a reference
but who is not necessarily bound by them and whose decision shall
be conclusive and binding on the parties.53 Here again there is a
temptation to insert some standard, such as "limited only by recognized accounting principles," to guide the accountant, but it is
the opinion of this writer that the temptation should be resisted.
Such a standard will add little if anything to the actual criteria
which the accountant will use in reaching his decision, but it opens
the door to assertions by disappointed parties that the accountant
has acted beyond his discretion. On balance, it would seem preferable to choose the disinterested accountant with great care and
then rely upon his integrity and ability to insure a fair and impartial decision. This method will be more expensive than mere reliance on the corporate books, but the reduction of the chances of
disputes and litigation should justify the additional expense in
most instances. It will be noted, of course, that this method embodies an approach similar to that found in the appraisal and arbitration methods. However, it is tied to the general concept of
"book value" which may be attractive to the parties, and yet it
minimizes some of the risks inherent in that concept.
A more fundamental objection directed toward the use of
"book value," regardless of who applies that concept, is that it is
an unreliable guide to the measurement of actual values.54 It is
commonly a record of historical costs and rarely reflects the current values of the corporation's assets. The amounts which appear
in the depreciation reserves represent an amortization of original
cost rather than an accurate picture of the wear and tear on the
assets. Intangibles, like good will, are seldom shown on the balance
sheet or are carried at nominal figures, although they often comprise a large part of the real value of a small business. Inventory is
usually carried at "lower of cost or market" which, when used
in the computation of "book value," gives an obvious advantage to the purchaser under the buy-sell agreement.55 In short,
a book value approach normally gives an asset-by-asset compil53 See LAIKIN, DEATH, TAXES AND YOUR BUSINESS 24 (1948).
54 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 799 (1952).
55 See RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed.,

109 (1953).
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ation of cost (even neglecting some assets) rather than a gomgconcern valuation.
This may not be undesirable in all cases. Good will may disappear with the disappearance of a key stockholder. Book values
may otherwise approximate actual values. All the parties may be
willing to gamble on whatever discrepancies remain. "There is
some suspicion that book value is occasionally prescribed as the
valuation basis, though substantial intangible values exist, because of the fear of the complexity and cost of evaluating intangibles, and the probability of litigation." 56
The crucial point to be recognized here is that whether the
parties want an accurate reflection of true values or whether they
are willing to allow considerable leeway, they must spell out their
intentions precisely. The mere use of the term "book value" will
not assure either result. 57 If the agreement refers to "book value,"
it should specify whether this means as shown on the books used
for corporate or for tax purposes. 58 All elements which might create disputes should be carefully delineated as to their inclusion or
exclusion from "book value," and the exact bases of inclusion
should be described. A partial list of items that should be dealt
with includes recognition of appreciation or diminution in the
value of assets, method of depreciation, method of inventory valuation, treatment of reserves for contingencies, recognition of good
will and other intangibles, method of computing bad debt reserves,
and capitalization of repairs and improvements. "In any event,
unless the agreement calls for the separate valuation of goodwill,
it should expressly provide that the amount to be paid for the
decedent's interests includes payment for goodwill. Disputes and
litigation between the parties and with the tax authorities may
result if this is overlooked."59 The lawyer should work with the
company's accountant and receive his approval of the various

56 Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements," 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 408
at 408 (1956).
57 Compare Aron v. Gillman, 309 N.Y. 157, 128 N.E. (2d) 284 (1955), with Druchlieb
v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 211, 102 N.E. 599 (1913).
58 Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 325 at 328 (1952).
59 LAIKIN, DEATH, TAXES AND YOUR BUSINESS 24-25 (1948); Forster, "Valuing a Business
Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale Agreement," 4 STAN. L. ·R.Ev. 325 at
330 (1952); Estate of George Marshall Trammell, 18 T.C. 662 (1952), acq., 1953-1 CUM.
BUL. 6; Rev. Rul. 157, 1953-2 CUM. BUL. 255; Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code §20.2031-3,
21 FED. REG. 7867 (1956).
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definitions embodied in the agreement. Then the parties should
be jointly consulted and the consequences of the definitions should
be fully explained. 60 There are, of course, limitations in terms of
the time and money that can be expended on the drafting of such
provisions, but, within reasonable bounds and after consultation
with the accountants, the attorney should be able to draft a fairly
comprehensive provision which will eliminate major future
disputes.
Providing elaborate definitions of the components of "book
value" is not as essential where the determination is left to a disinterested third party. If the third party was trusted sufficiently
to be made the arbiter of the "book value" issue, he can probably
be depended upon to take into account the intent of the parties,
though not being hamstrung by a legal obligation to do so.
Care should also be taken to provide for the precise date on
which the "book value" is to be determined. It might be the end
of a specified accounting period, the date notice of the desire to
sell is given, the date of death, or the date the survivors give notice of. their intent to purchase. "Ordinarily, in order to avoid
closing books, making an audit and taking an inventory, it is preferable to provide that book value will be calculated as of the
end of the last preceding fiscal or calendar year or some other designated accounting period." 61 Provisions may also be made for appropriate adjustments for the period between the above date and
the date of death or payment. 62 Perhaps some requirement for
periodic review of the book value clause by the parties might also
be included. 63
A buy-sell agreement which uses "book value" as its pricefixing mechanism is widely regarded as a valid agreement, neither
confiscatory, a restraint on alienation, nor against public policy. 64
The desirability of using this method is open to greater doubt. 615
60 Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for Purposes of a Purchase and Sale Agreement;" 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 325 at 328 (1952).
61 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 773 at 800 (1952).
62 See Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 325 at 329 (1952).
63 Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements," 95 TRUSIS AND EsrATES 408
(1956).
64 See, e.g., Coleman v. Kettering, (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) 289 S.W. (2d) 953; but see
Security Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz, (Ala. 1949) 38 S. (2d) 274.
65 See Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the Transferability of Stock," 43 ILL. B. J. 766 at 774 (1955).
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It is not as flexible as a formula or renegotiated fixed-price method,
but it might be made so with periodic review. Its accuracy as a
measure of value will generally depend on the nature of the business, the accounting practices of the corporation, and the modifications made in those practices under the agreement. Unless terms
are meticulously defined or a third party's definition is made conclusively binding, use of "book value" is apt to provoke controversy at the operative date.

Capitalization of Earnings and Other Formulae
The technique of capitalizing earnings has been used with
some success in other contexts to arrive at the going-concern value
of any given enterprise. 66 Stated simply, it involves the multiplication of the average annual net earnings of the business by some
fixed figure known as the rate of capitalization. Other formula
methods, including the two-step technique of A.R.M. 34,67 are
variations and refinements of the basic capitalization of earnings
approach. Most authorities agree that a formula method of valuation is not generally satisfactory for use as the price-fixing mechanism in a buy-sell agreement, 68 but there are some dissents from
this conclusion. 69 Although criticism is usually levelled at the
"complicated calculations" involved in a formula method,70 this
is not really an accurate appraisal of the problem. The actual
computation of a price under a formula is a relatively simple,
mechanical matter. If the rates of capitalization which are used as
multipliers are specified in the agreement, the only unknown
quantity remaining at the time of computation is the "average net
earnings" or similar base figure. Once this latter figure is determined (a task which need not be difficult), the steps remaining to

66 See RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 109 (1953).
67 2 CuM. BUL. 31 (1920). This involves a determination of the earning power of the
tangible and intangible assets of a business through a capitalization of these items at
different rates. See also Gardner, "The SEC and Valuation Under Chapter X," 91 UNIV.
PA. L. R.Ev. 440 (1943).
68 See, e.g., Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the
Transferability of Stock," 43 Iu.. B. J. 766 at 775 (1955); ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CoRPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 109-110 (1953).
69 See, e.g., Swados, "Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell
Agreement," 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 189 at 193 (1957).
10 See Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the Transferability of Stock," 43 ILL. B. J. 766 at 775 (1955).
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arrive at the ultimate price are merely matters of simple
arithmetic.
The real difficulty with formula methods when used in ordinary close corporation buy-sell agreements is one of fairness. The
elements of the formula are not usually reliable guides to a true
valuation of the business. Perhaps the most unreliable element
is the rate of capitalization itself. The draftsman is forced to decide
what exact multiple of earnings would accurately reflect the true
value of the business. He might be able to use the price-earnings
ratio of stock in a comparable busine~s which has a readily ascertainable market value.71 But finding a comparable business will be
hard and there is no assurance that the comparability will persist
until the time the formula is to be employed. Or he might adopt a
figure that seems appropriate in view of the nature of the business.
Although most experts will not hazard a guess as to the "correct"
rate of capitalization for businesses in general,72 Dewing has classified businesses into certain categories and assigned rates of capitalization to each category.73 He suggests a multiple of four for small
businesses of a rank and file chai:acter, but even this figure must be
reduced for new or personal businesses or those seasonal in nature.74 Although his estimates are based upon experience and, to
some extent, judicial opinions, there is no assurance that they will
be accurate in any given case. This is especially true where the
corporation is small and its fortunes subject to wide fluctuations.
Any figure selected by the draftsman, though based on sound
judgment and authority, will be no more than an intelligent
guess. Moreover, the passage of time may cause the guess made on
the agreement date to be entirely inappropriate to the character of
the business as it exists at the operative date.
Then, too, the fair period over which earnings are to be averaged must be designated. If predicted incorrectly, this decision
could lead to a serious distortion of the value of the business. The
period ought to be long enough to allow temporary fluctuations
to be discounted and short enough to reflect adequately the current earnings picture of the company. Consideration should be
given to whether there should be adjustments made for special

71 See BADGER, VALUATION OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITIES 119 (1925).
72See, e.g., 1 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 259-266 (1937).
1 DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 390-391 (1953).

73
74 Id. at 389-390.
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circumstances, such as war or recessions, during the designated
period.75
The other key element in the formula is the "annual net
earnings." Unless this figure is truly representative of the current
earnings status of the company and also sufficiently typical to be
the basis for the prediction of future earnings, the ultimate price
arrived at under the formula will not be a "fair" approximation
of going-concern value. Here again the fact that the operative contingency, such as death of a major stockholder, may severely impair the earning potential of the business has to be reckoned with.
If no adjustment is made for that fact, the value based on current
earnings will be unrealistically high.
The annual net earnings which appear on the income statement of the ordinary close corporation do not represent the real
earning power of the business and to use that figure, without modification, would result in an inequitable price. For in most close
corporations a substantial part of the realized income is withdrawn
in the form of high salaries, which are recorded in the income
statement as an expense which reduces net earnings. Therefore it
is essential to provide for some adjustment in the net earnings
figure as it appears on the books, unless it is felt that some other
factor, such as the loss of the departing shareholder, counterbalances the omission of these salaries. However, one writer warns
that the designation of salaries above a specified amount as profits for capitalization of earnings purposes might be inviting tax
grief since it puts a red flag on the unreasonableness of these salaries as corporate business expenses. 76 A further distortion of actual
earnings may exist because of abnormally high interest payments
being made to stockholders or their families, and attempts to correct this distortion in the price-fixing formula might have similar
tax repercussions. Non-recurring items of income and expense,
unusual business conditions, and foreseeable changes can also
undermine the representative character of the reported net earnings and should be provided for if the formula is to work fairly. 77
In the formative years of a business operation, earnings, if any, are
apt to be very small; yet this may not be indicative of the paten75 ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 110
(1953).
76 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Plan•
ning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 773 at 803, n. 111 (1952).
77 Id. at 802.
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tial growth of the enterprise, which m!1,y prosper once it has taken
roots. To capitalize earnings upon the basis of these early figures
would· not do justice to a departing shareholder whose efforts
helped create that eventual prosperity.
The person or method for determining "average annual net
earnings," or both, should be fully described in the buy-sell agreement.78 Here again the draftsman must decide how many standards
he wants to spell out and how much he wants to leave to the judgment of the arbiter, whose decision should be binding.
Use of a capitalization of earnings formula in a buy-sell agreement appears to be needlessly cumbersome in most cases. Where
the corporation is relatively small or unestablished, earnings
figures and capitalization rates are poor indicia of true enterprise
value.79 A provision for periodic review of the formula clause,
with the old formula to apply if no agreement is reached, might
help to keep the formula current but seems, on the whole, insufficient to justify the use of a formula in the ordinary close corporation. The extensive use of accounting terminology in formula
techniques tends to stimulate disputes, although much of this can
be avoided by careful drafting. In larger close corporations, where
the amounts involved are substantial, where the book net earnings
are apt to be a fair reflection of the company's position, and where
capitalization rates have been tested and verified, a formula may be
the best device for determining value and the extra cost and difficulty of drafting may be justified.

Appraisal or Arbitration
Another device, which is often employed in conjunction with
one of the other methods but which can be used as an independent
method of price-fixing, is the utilization of third parties-appraisers or arbitrators-to set the price under the agreement when it
becomes operative. The basic difference between appraisal and
arbitration is that the former entails the submission of the price
decision to the third party as an initial matter whereas the latter
calls upon the third party to decide only if and when the parties
themselves have failed to agree on a suitable transfer price. 80
78 RoHRLICH,

ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,

(1953).
Ibid.
so See Matter of Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440 at 445, 143 N.E. 248 (1924).

79

rev. ed., 110
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The term "appraisal" usually suggests a technique by which
the underlying assets of a business entity are evaluated. To the extent this connotation is correct, appraisal would not seem wellsuited for price determination under a buy-sell agreement, at least
where a "fair" price is desired and the business is worth more
than the sum total of its component assets. It is perfectly possible,
however, to have the third party or parties, whether they be professional appraisers or not, value the business on some basis other
than mere asset value. If it is desired that "book value" or "capitalization of earnings" be used as a guide to the appraisal, such a
standard can be designated in the agreement. 81 The danger of restricting a third party by some ambiguous standard has already
been mentioned, and perhaps it might be wiser to specify that the
appraisal need not be confined to the asset value of the corporation
but may (not must) take into consideration any other factors
deemed significant by the appraiser, including book value, net
earnings, and market prices of similar stocks.82
There seems to be little doubt that provisions leaving the determination of price in a buy-sell agreement to the appraisal of
third parties are valid. 83 The agreement should include the names
of the appraisers or the method by which they are to be selected,
who is to pay them and how, and a provision for substitution of
new appraisers if the designated ones should be unwilling or unable to serve. The usual method of selection is for each party to
choose one appraiser at the time the specified event takes place
and have those two appraisers select a third. 84 This should include a provision explaining how the third appraiser , is to be
chosen in case of deadlock and requiring that the decision of any
two of the three be binding on the parties. 85 Other methods of selection include designating certain named parties, perhaps the
81 See O'Neal, '\Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting,'' 65 HARv. L. REV. 773 at 804 (1952).
82 But see Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and
Sale Agreement," 4 STAN. L. REv. 325 at 333 (1952), who insists on giving the appraiser
specific standards to do the job.
83 See cases cited in Annotation: Provision of articles, by-laws, or agreement regarding future determination by parties other than owner of price at which corporate stock
is to be taken over by corporation or stockholders upon specified event, ll7 A.L.R. 1359
(1938).
84 See, e.g., provision in Good Fellows Associates v. Silverman, 283 Mass. 173 at 178,
186 N.E. 48 (1933).
85 Cf. Currie, "Buy and Sell Agreements With Respect to Corporate and Partnership
Interests,'' 1950 Wis. L. REv. 12 at 18.
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company's regular accountant, at the time the agreeme_nt is
drafted. 86 The major drawback of the use of appraisal as the sole
method for price determination is its expense. 87 Where a substantial sum is involved, however, and there are prospects of future
disagreements if such other methods as book value or capitalization of earnings are used, the expense might be worthwhile.
The use of "arbitration" has the advantage of first allowing
the parties to try to fix their own price. As a practical matter, the
chances of the parties agreeing at the operative date seem slim, although this may not be true where there is a sympathetic relationship between the survivors and the departing shareholder or his
heirs. Also, the threat of arbitration hanging over the heads of the
parties will tend to curb their more arbitrary tendencies. The considerations involved in guiding arbitrators by standards and the
methods of selecting arbitrators are basically the same as those
discussed under appraisal. A more serious problem that may be encountered as to arbitration is its legality. In some states an executory contract to arbitrate is unenforceable.88 There is also some disagreement as to whether the fixing of a price is an arbitrable issue. 89 The possibility that a price fixed by appraisal or arbitration
will not be binding on the Commissioner for federal estate tax
purposes will be considered in the subsequent section on tax
problems.

Fixed Price
Another widely adopted method is the use of a specified figure,
either a fixed dollar amount or par value, as the take-over price
under the agreement. Such a price may be satisfactory for a short
period of time, 90 but it will eventually fall out of line with the true
value of the corporation's stock. Although this discrepancy in
value will not normally invalidate the agreement, 91 a few courts

86 See Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. REv. 325 at 333 (1952).
87 See ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed.,
112 (1953).
88 See note 34 supra.
89 See court's discussion of this question in In re Marshall, 147 Misc. 4, 262 N.Y.S.
191 (1930).
90 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. REv. 773 at 801 (1952).
91-Compare Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 222 Pa. 58, 70 A. 956 (1908), with Sands v.
Miner, 16 App. Div. 347, 44 N.Y.S. 894 (1897).
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consider such agreements unconscionable92 and some state agencies
will refuse to accept articles of incorporation containing such provisions.93 Regardless of the legality of the technique, it seems
highly undesirable where the parties have any wish to obtain a
"fair" price for their interests.
By the addition of a provision for periodic redetermination of
the price by the parties, however, the above unfairness can be
largely obviated and the fixed-price method can become one of the
most effective devices for setting the price under a buy-sell agreement.94 "A typical clause would provide for a yearly review of the
price on the same day as the annual meeting of the shareholders
and, further, that the new price, if any, should not become effective until reduced to writing and signed by all the parties...." 95
The advantages of this method are numerous. It is easy to draft, to
understand, and to apply. It does not involve any confusing formulae and it is entirely free from specific standards and basic terms
which might later generate disputes. 96 It enables the parties to
judge their status at a glance and to adjust their activities accordingly. It does not force the parties to determine the value of the enterprise in any particular manner but rather permits them to hammer out a valuation which seems fair in the light of all factors
known to them, including the effect of a stockholder's withdrawal
from the corporation. Moreover, it is an extremely flexible method
which is able to adjust annually to the changing fortunes of the
business. Most significantly, it operates on the self-interest of all
the parties to the agreement and is therefore calculated to insure
the achievement of a "fair" price, so long as their bargaining positions and chances of survival remain equal. As Forster concludes in
his article on valuation, "as of any given time, the owners of a business are the persons best able to determine what it is worth." 97 In
92 See,
93 See

e.g., Greene v. E. H. Rollins &: Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. (2d) 249 (1938).
O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 773 at 783-784 (1952).
94 See Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the
Transferability of Stock," 43 Iu.. B. J. 766 at 775 (1955).
95 Overbeck and Teevan, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Buy and Sell
Agreements," 43 ILL. B.J. 264 at 277 (1955).
96 But see Rohrlich, "Legal Problems in the Organization and Structure of a Close
Business Corporation," 124 N.Y. L.J. 282, col. 2 (1950), for a quaere whether a procedure
which requires periodic agreement among the parties doesn't tend to keep alive a point
of issue, with the danger of bringing disagreement rather than agreement to the surface.
97 Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 325 at 331 (1952).
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view of the fact that interests in close corporations are not usually
readily saleable and do not have any clear market values, it has
been argued that the value arrived at by arm's-length agreement
of the parties is "probably as fair as any." 98 And, as long as it operates smoothly, it is very inexpensive.
It should be evident that the most serious shortcoming of the
periodically-renegotiated fixed-price method as formulated thus
far is its susceptibility to abuse by a shareholder who expects to
be a survivor. By holding out for a low valuation or refusing to
agree and thereby perpetuating the existing low price, he can force
a cheap takeover. 09 There is also the problem of the parties' indolence or neglect which may cause an old price to continue in
existence long after it has ceased adequately to reflect "fair" value.
One writer has suggested that a remedy for these problems might
lie in a "safety clause" providing that the fixed price should not
be binding on the parties unless it had been reviewed and approved within, say, two years. And, in the event the old fixed price
lapsed, some alternative should be prescribed, such as keeping the
old price as a base but automatically adjusting it by the increase
or decrease in "book value" between the date of its adoption and
the operative date of the agreement. 100 The trouble with this suggestion is that it gives the prospective survivor two years in which
to take advantage of the old value and also introduces all the problems inherent in a "book value" technique at the end of those two
years. A preferable solution would seem to be a clause which requires the use of appraisal or arbitration to fix the price whenever
the shareholders cannot agree or whenever there has been no review of the old price within thirty or sixty days of the date specified for renegotiation. 101 The self-interest of the parties and intelligent supervision of their interests by their counsel and accountants should prevent a perpetuation of an old price through

OSLAIKIN, DEATH, TAXES AND YOUR BUSINESS 27 (1948); but see Krebs v. McDonald's
Exr., (Ky. 1953) 266 S.W. (2d) 87 at 90, where the court commented on the fact that the
valuations arrived at periodically under the fixed-price agreement never sensitively
reflected the changes in actual value throughout the years.
99 But see Chase Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 406, 39 N.Y.S.
(2d) 370 (1943), where the court undertook to set a fair price when one stockholder
refused to agree ,because of the bad health of the other stockholder.
100 See Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements,'' 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES
408 (1956).
101 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting,'' 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 806 (1952).
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neglect. The draftsman might also want to specify that the
appraiser or arbitrator take as his basis for valuation the price last
agreed upon by the parties and modify that price only to the extent
that the shares have changed their value since the last setting of
that price.102
One problem that inheres in the fixed-price method, even with
periodic redetermination, is the failure of the agreed price to reflect drastic changes that may have occurred in the business between the date of the last agreed price and the operative date of the
agreement. These changes might result from such things as dividend payments or other withdrawals, extraordinary profits or
losses, assessment of heavy taxes, and the like. One way of minimizing the risk of such occurrences is to increase the frequency of the
required redeterminations. However, the increased accuracy of reflected value must be weighed against the additional inconvenience to the parties. It does not seem too burdensome, however, to require the redetermination to be made once every six
months, especially if the corporation has a semi-annual audit
which allows the parties to evaluate quickly the change in
the corporation's financial position. It would also be possible to provide for the parties to make some adjustment in
the price for designated extraordinary events, based perhaps
on actual or anticipated changes in the next balance sheet.
But this might invite controversy as to the proper adjustments. Perhaps the best solution is to combine closely spaced
periods of renegotiation with a provision for a responsible
third party's adjustment of the last price for extraordinary events
since it was set, his decision to be binding. Or the draftsman may
conclude that the chances of anything drastic happening from
one period to the next are so slight that all parties ought to take
the risk since, at the time of drafting, the discrepancy has as much
chance of working in favor of each party as against him.
As was the case with a book value method, the agreement
should specify that all factors, including good will and other
intangibles, were taken into consideration in arriving at the initial
price. It would probably be better to omit any requirement that a
particular factor be considered by the parties in their later determinations, since this subjects later fixed prices to possible attack
for alleged failure to take such a factor into account.
102Ibid.
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It is this writer's opinion that, as a general proposition, the
fixed-price technique, periodically renegotiated with the above
modifications, provides the most satisfactory method for arriving at a "fair" price simply and inexpensively.

Combination of Methods
There are innumerable combinations of the basic methods
which can be used effectively. Adding appraisal or arbitration to
the fixed-price method can, as illustrated above, be helpful in
many instances. The draftsman of a buy-sell agreement for a new
business might consider the possibility of employing a par value or
book value method during the formative years of the enterprise
and switching to a formula technique after a predetermined
number of years or the achievement of a certain amount of net
earnings or both. Suggestions have been made for the use of different valuation techniques to determine the value of different
assets, such as appraisal for land and buildings, book value for
inventory and fixtures, mutual agreement for patents and trademarks, and capitalization of earnings for good will.103 Or one technique can be used to limit another technique, for example, providing that the appraisal value shall not be less than "book
value." 104 Then there is the possibility of averaging the results
arrived at under two or more different methods.105
Another variation that merits consideration is a provision
which varies the price or the price-fixing method with the nature
of the transfer. 106 The agreement might provide that if the corporation or surviving shareholders become obligated to buy the stock
of the departing stockholder because of death, disability, or
retirement after a certain age (say sixty-five), the purchase price
will be 100 percent of the amount determined under the valuation method in the agreement; but if the transfer is for any other
reason, such as an early voluntary withdrawal or dismissal for
cause, the purchase price will be a lesser percentage, say 80 or
90 percent, of that valuation. This variation may discourage a

103 RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING

CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., II3

(1953).
104 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, " 65 HARv. L. 'R.Ev. 773 at 806 (1952).
105 Ibid.
10a Id. at 807.
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shareholder from voluntarily withdrawing from the corporation
when the agreed price looks high or the business prospects look
low.107 Moreover, it will be useful in reducing the financial impact of an unexpected withdrawal which cannot be protected
against by funding with insuranc:e as can death and, perhaps,
disability or retirement after a fixed date. Whether this difference
in price for some inter vivos transfers as compared with the price
at death will have any adverse tax consequences is considered in
the following section.
TAX

CONSIDERATIONS

There are significant tax consequences which attach to the
adoption and use of a restrictive agreement, and the draftsman
must consider them very carefully in selecting, the appropriate
form for the agreement. Tax factors may affect or control, among
other things, whether the agreement should be a cross-purchase
type (among the stockholders exclusively) or an entity type (with
the corporation as the redeeming party), and whether the agreement should be funded by insurance. Indeed, one writer has
suggested that the obsession with taxes often obscures the more
fundamental business and estate planning objectives of restrictive agreements.108 The need for balanced planning cannot be
denied, but it is undoubtedly true that tax considerations weigh
heavily in the balance. It is not within the scope of this article
to deal with the tax consequences of restrictive agreements as
such. A number of good articles have been written on the subject.109 However, insofar as taxes have a bearing on the choice
of a price-fixing mechanism, they have a particular relevance
here. Their impact is most noticeable in the area of estate and
inheritance valuation of closely held stock; for, with proper planning, the price fixed under the restrictive agreement can be conclusive of value for federal estate tax purposes and, sometimes,
for state inheritance tax purposes.110 The agreed price does not,
101 Ibid.
10s See Swados,

"Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell Agreement," 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 189 at 216 (1957).
109 See, e.g., Friedman, "Buy and Sell Agreements: A Review and a New Look,"
N.Y. UNIV. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053 (1957); comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 578 (1959);
note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1958).
110 See Matter of Miller's Estate, 191 Misc. 784, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 372 (1948). But see
In re Cowles, 36 Wash. (2d) 710, 219 P. (2d) 964 (1950). See also note, 71 HARv. L. REv.
687 at 691 (1958).
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however, fix the valuation of the stock for federal gift tax purposes.111 The advantages of having the restricted price establish
the value of the stock for estate tax purposes are substantial. It
permits more intelligent estate planning by providing a measure
of the future estate tax to be assessed and it precludes a long and
costly battle with the Internal Revenue Service over the proper
valuation.112 More important, however"' is the protection it offers
against the estate's being burdened with heavy taxes- based upon
a high valuation for stock which is actually sold at a lower figure.113 The significance of this last advantage should not be overlooked. Where the Commissioner is not bound by the price in
the restrictive agreement, his own valuation is presumed to be correct by the courts.114 And the executor's chances of sustaining
a figure even reasonably close to his own valuation are not
good.115 The estate tax considerations are important even in
corporations whose shareholders have estates small enough to
qualify for exemption from federal estate taxes. The restrictive
agreement is a long-term arrangement and the fortunes of the
corporation or its constituent shareholders may be greatly changed
when a death finally makes the agreement operative.
There is some confusion as to exactly what effect a restrictive
agreement can have on federal estate tax valuation of the closely
held stock. Although the Commissioner officially contends that
he need not be bound by a price incorporated within a restrictive
agreement regardless of the circumstances,116 the courts have
limited the estate tax valuation to the restricted price, despite
the Commissioner's objection, where certain essential elements
were present.117 Briefly stated, those elements are (I) the agreement must restrict the right of the stockholder to transfer his stock

111 See Rev. Rul. 189, 1953-2 CuM. BUL. 294; Commissioner v. McCann, (2d Cir. 1944)
146 F. (2d) 385.
112See Friedman, "Buy and Sell Agreements: A Review and a New Look," N.Y.
UNIV. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053 at 1068 (1957).
113 See Koch, "Estate Planning and Tax Aspects of the Buy and Sell Agreement,"
5 J. All[. Soc. OF CHARTERED LIFE UNDERWRITERS 65 at 75 (1949).
114 See Rice, "The Valuation of Close Held Stocks: A Lottery in Federal Taxation,"
98 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 367 at 378 (1950), and cases cited therein.
115 See Pavenstedt, "The Second Circuit Reaffirms the Efficacy of Restrictive Stock
Agreements To Control Estate Tax Valuation," 51 MICH. L. REv. 1 at 6 (1952).
116 See Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code, §20.2031-2(h), 21 FED. REc. 7867 (1956).
117 See, e.g., Lomb v. Sudgen, (2d Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 166; May v. McGowan, (2d
Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 396.
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during his life as well as upon death,118 (2) the agreed price
upon an inter vivos transfer under the agreement cannot be higher
than upon death,119 (3) the estate must be bound to sell at
death, either absolutely or at the option of the specified purchaser,120 (4) the agreement must contain a stipulated price or a
technique for determining the price, 121 (5) and the agreement
must have been a good faith, arm's-length transaction entered
into for full and adequate consideration as of the time it was
signed.122 An option in the prospective purchaser will have the
same binding effect on valuation as a mandatory purchase (buysell agreement) if all the required elements are present.123 The
Commissioner and the courts will examine more closely agreements between related parties since the elements of full and adequate consideration, good faith, and arm's-length bargaining may
be missing. 124 The omission of good will as a factor in setting the
price may also subject the transaction to greater scrutiny.125 The
failure to include a proportionate share of the insurance proceeds
in the computation of the decedent's interest under an insurancefunded entity plan may also reflect upon the adequacy of consideration, good faith, and arm's-length bargaining.126
As can be seen from the above summary, the more accurately
the price or price-fixing method in the agreement approximates
actual value the more likely the Commissioner is to accept that
price as determinative for estate tax purposes. Thus, the draftsman
has an additional reason for trying to give the parties a "fair"
price. Presumably, a capitalization of earnings method or other
formula which takes a number of factors into consideration would
be the most acceptable to the Commissioner since it represents
11s See, e.g., Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944), acq. 1944-1 CuM. BUL. 19.
119 See Baltimore Nat. Bank v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 642 at 654.
120 See, e.g., Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954), acq. 1955-2 CuM. BuL. 10.
121 See, e.g., Brodrick v. Gore, (10th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 892.
122 See Edith M. Bense!, 36 B.T.A. 246 at 253 (1937), affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d)
639; Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code, §20.2031-2(h), 21 FED. REG. 7867 (1956).
123 See Friedman, "Buy and Sell Agreements: A Review and a New Look," N.Y.
UNIV. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053 at 1078 (1957).
124 See Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 Cull!. BUL. 187 at 193-194; Claire Giannini Hoffman,
2 T.C. 1160 (1943).
125 See Estate of George Marshall Trammell, 18 T.C. 662 (1952), acq. 1953-1 CuM.
BUL. 6; Rev. Rul. 157, 1953-2 CUM. BUL. 255; Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code, §20.2031-3,
21 FED. REG. 7867 (1956).
126 Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code, §20.2042-l(c)(6), 21 FED. REG. 7886 (1956). See
note, 71 HARV. L. REv. 687 at 693-694 (1958); Friedman, "Buy and Sell Agreements: A
Review and a New Look," N.Y. UNIV. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053 at 1073-1076 (1957).
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an obvious attempt to reach a fair arm's-length valuation.127
However, the courts have equally sustained other methods, such
as book value, 128 par value, 129 and fixed price130 even where the
discrepancy between the restricted price and actual value was considerable. The addition of a provision for periodic renegotiation
of a fixed price would seem to reinforce the binding nature of
the restricted price since it tends to reduce even more that discrepancy. This is subject to a caveat, however, in the case of related parties who might use such an arrangement to set a high
price when an inter vivos sale was contemplated and a low price
when death was anticipated.131
The methods that are subject to the most doubt as to their
binding effect on the Commissioner are appraisal and arbitration. Hornstein states 'that the federal taxing authorities "are
not bound by a price to be determined by appraisers or arbitrators."132 He cites no authority for this proposition, however, and
none has been found by this writer. Koch asserts that "the purchase price must be capable of being ascertained pursuant to the
provisions of the buy and sell agreement." 133 But the case law is
silent on this question and it does not appear to have been squarely
presented to a court. The rationale of the concept that a restricted
price can limit the valuation for estate tax purposes, however,
does not seem to support this notion of ascertainability. If the
stock can be sold only for a certain price, it has no .greater
value to the decedent or his estate than that price. The fact that
the price is not read1ly ascertainable from the face of the agreement does not alter its restrictive quality. The time necessary to
ascertain the price under a complex formula or book value method
may be longer than that necessary for an appraisal by an independent third party. And a precise dollars-and-cents figure may be as
121 See Swados, "Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell Agreement," 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 189 at 193 (1957).
128 See, e.g., Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954), acq. 1955-2 CUM. BuL. 10.
129 See, e.g., Helmholz v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 165 (1933), affd. on other grounds
(D.C. Cir. 1934) 75 F. (2d) 245, affd. 296 U.S. 93 (1935).
130 See, e.g., Wilson v. Bowers, (2d Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 682.
131 See Edith M. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937), affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 639;
WARREN AND SURREY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIET TAXATION 611 (1956). See also note, 71
HARV. L. REV. 687 at 692, n. 24 (1958).
132 Hornstein, "Arbitration in the 'Incorporated Partnership,'" 12 ARB. J. 28 at 29
(1957).
133 Koch, "Estate Planning and Tax Aspects of the Buy and Sell Agreement,'' 5 J.
AM. Soc. OF CHARTERED LIFE UNDERWRITERS 65 at 75 (1949).
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obscure from the face of the agreement when the former methods
are used as the latter. The real test should be whether the decedent's stock was subject to sale at a price fixed under a predetermined method rather than being saleable without limitation on
price. Thus where the agreement requires a sale but omits a
price or price-fixing device, there has been no effective limitation
on the price at which the stock must be transferred and its value
has been affected only insofar as the range of prospective purchasers has been narrowed to a designated group. Where, however, the estate is bound to sell at a price set by an independent
third party, the value of the stock has been as effectively limited
as if the price had been set by an independent formula. This is
even more evident where a fixed price plus renegotiation method
has limited the price, and the mere addition of appraisal or arbitration as an alternative method in no way undermines the
restrictive character of the price-fixing provision. Where the
agreement specifies only that the price is to be determined by the
parties at the time of death and, if they cannot agree, then by
arbitration, the actual use of the arbitrator's valuation should
bind the Commissioner. If, on the other hand, the arbitration
is not utilized because the parties themselves have agreed, the
Commissioner is still free to attack the price as not having been
reached by an arm's length deal or for full and adequate
consideration.
Until some case law definitively answers these questions, the
area of appraisal or arbitration is not free from doubt. The use of
these methods, either independently or in conjunction with
others, is a question of judgment for the draftsman who must
weigh the risks of adverse tax consequences against the anticipated
advantages of the methods. Some comfort may be taken in the likelihood that a price fixed by appraisal or arbitration will be close
to the "true" value, although there is no assurance that the
Commissioner will agree as to what is "true" value.
Another price-fixing decision which may be affected by tax
considerations is whether to provide for a cheaper take-over on
certain transfers, like early retirement, than on others, like death.
The fact that a formula or book value method inherently permits
such variations does not appear to change the binding effect of
the restrictive price upon estate tax valuation.184 But if the agree134 See

note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 687 at 692 (1958).
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ment uses different methods for different events, such as "book
value" upon death but 80 percent of "book value" on voluntary
retirement, some contention may be made that the restricted
price is not binding on the death of the stockholder for estate
tax purposes.135 Such a contention ought not to be sustained,
however, since the cases seem to regard agreements as not binding
only when an inter vivos transfer price can be higher than the
price on death. 136 The estate tax danger is that the parties will
provide for inter vivos transfers at a fair price but reduce that
price at death to minimize estate taxes. No such danger is present
in the provision which merely attempts to value the stock somewhat lower when a stockholder voluntarily leaves the corporation
than when he is forced to withdraw. The value at death, which is
the only important consideration for estate tax purposes, is unaffected by this inter vivos modification. Nevertheless, the draftsman may conclude that the absence of such a variation would
make the agreement "cleaner" for tax purposes. This would be
especially true where the corporate entity is the purchaser because
the percentage feature might accentuate the non-corporate purpose of the entity agreement, thereby subjecting the redemption
payments to treatment as constructive dividends to the surviving
stockholders.137

135 Cf. ibid.
136 See, e.g.,

Baltimore Nat. Bank v. United States, (D.C. -Md. 1955) 136 F. Supp.
642 at 654.
137 Compare Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952), and Tucker v. Commissioner, (8th Cir.
1955) 226 F. (2d) 177, with Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957). Also see Emeloid Co.
v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 230; note, 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 687 at 702-707
(1958).

